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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
to rule on this point, but cases concerning it have arisen in other jurisdic-
tions.'
A liberal view should characterize the interpretation and application
of the workmen's compensation law, with the object of providing com-
pensation for every employee suffering injury from an industrial acci-
dent, regardless of his mere technical or unavoidable non-compliance with
the provisions for notice and filing claims. It is submitted that the policy
of the Act would have justified employing principles of apparent agency
in the instant case, and would justify extension of the statutory period in
the case of a latent injury. If, however, the statutory limitation on notice
is jurisdictional as a number of cases suggest, this is a place where fair-
ness calls for amendment of the statute.
JAMES W. THOMPSON
UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT INSTRUCTION HELD REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NEGLI-
GENCE ACTIONS.-The deceased, while shoveling sand onto a slippery high-
way from the back of a highway maintenance truck, fell into the path of
the defendant's transport truck and was killed. The plaintiffs claimed as
negligence the transport driver's failure to see the turn signal indicator on
the maintenance truck, his failure to sound the horn of his own truck, and
his failure to slow down for a potentially dangerous situation. The court
gave an unavoidable accident instruction and the jury returned a verdict for
the defendants. On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, held, reversed
and remanded for a new trial. If there is any evidence from which the jury
can infer negligence on the part of the defendant, an instruction on un-
avoidable accidents is reversible error. Leach v. Great Northern Ry. Co.,
360 P.2d 94 (Mont. 1961) (Justice Castles dissenting).
Jury instructions should "outline the elements of legal liability, ex-
plain the concept of burden of proof ... and describe the respective func-
tions of judge and jury."' The formulation of brief and clear instructions
is the best assurance that the jury will give them the proper weight. In
the instant case the question is whether the instruction given on unavoid-
able accidents was necessary in order for the jury to completely understand
the substantive law or whether it was superfluous, misleading, and confus-
ing. The disputed instruction read as follows:
In law we recognize what is termed an unavoidable or in-
inevitable accident. These terms do not mean literally that it was
not possible for such an accident to be avoided. They simply de-
OSee Rutledge v. Sandlin, 181 Kan. 369, 310 P.2d 950 (1957), 19 MONT. L. REv. 170
(1958). See also cases cited in 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
§ 78.42(b) (1952), and supplement thereto.
'2 HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 886 (1956).
2Instant case at 97. The wording of the instruction is identical with the unavoid-
able accident instruction found in 1 CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL (B.A.J.I.)
310, No. 134 (4th ed. 1956).
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RECENT DECISIONS
note an accident that occurred without having been proximately
caused by negligence.
Even if such an accident could have been avoided by the use
of greater foresight, caution or skill than was required in the cir-
cumstances in the exercise of ordinary care, still no one may be
held liable for the injuries resulting from it.
Bear in mind, however, that if any defendant failed to exer-
cise care, and if that failure was a proximate cause of the accident
in question, then, whether or not such conduct was the sole cause,
the accident was not unavoidable, and the defense of unavoidability
may not be maintained by the defendant.
Whether or not the accident in question in this case was un-
avoidable is, of course, a question of fact for you to determine; and
in giving the foregoing instruction I do not imply any opinion or
suggestion as to what your finding should be.
In the ordinary negligence case the jurors are told that the plaintiff,
to recover compensation for his injuries, must show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant was negligent and that the defendant's
negligence was the proximate cause of these injuries." Since an unavoid-
able accident is simply an accident in which the defendant is not guilty of
negligence' adequate instructions on negligence, proximate cause, and the
respective burdens of proof should fully inform the jurors of the law in
regard to any accident which is unavoidable. But on the question of
whether the unavoidable accident instruction helps promote a better under-
standing of the law among the jurors, there is much dispute.
Those opposed to use of the instruction urge that it is not only un-
necessary but also confusing and misleading because it tends to repeat and
over-emphasize the defendant's case and tends to make jurors believe that
an "unavoidable accident" is a separate ground for avoiding liability.' It
may cause the jurors to overlook the negligence in failing to anticipate
an event which causes the accident; for example, the jury may seize on the
weather conditions or a mechanical failure to explain an accident without
properly considering whether the defendant should have anticipated those
conditions or circumstances. In the instant case, too much emphasis might
have been placed on the fact that the transport truck was only 15 feet from
the deceased when he fell onto the highway and too little emphasis might
have been placed on the fact that the transport driver failed to see the
highway truck's signal light, or to sound his horn, or to slow down when
he realized he was approaching a potentially dangerous situation.
$See instruction 14 of the instant case, Record, Vol. 3, p. 550; see also 1 CALIFORNIA
JuLRY INSTRUCTIONs, ClviL (B.A.J.I.) at 237, No. 101-I (4th ed. 1956).
'This definition of unavoidable accident is the broadcast of all possible definitions;
it includes accidents caused by anyone or anything other than the negligence of the
accused. For various accepted definitions and an extended discussion of the sub-ject, see Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 12 (1959). The instruction given in the present case
defines an unavoidable accident as "any accident that occurred without having been
proximately caused by negligence"; it is narrower In scope than the above definition
because it does not include accidents caused by the negligence of someone other
than the accused.
6Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Cal. 2d 652, 320 P.2d 500, 65 A.L.R. 2d 1 (1958).
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On the other hand it is claimed that an unavoidable accident instruc-
tion clarifies rather than confuses the situation in the minds of the jurors,
that the other instructions refer to the rule for unavoidable accidents only
by a negative implication, and that the jurors may need to be reminded
that accidents sometimes ,happen through the fault of no one. It is argued
that since the instruction makes the statement of the law more accurate and
easier to comprehend, it is fairer to all parties. Furthermore, since some
courts seem to be approaching the rule that the mere happening of an ac-
cident, without more, is evidence of negligence, it is thought particularly
important for the jury to be reminded that not all accidents are caused by
negligence.'
The effect of the instruction on the minds of the jurors is difficult to
measure and its evaluation is largely a matter of personal opinion. Deci-
sions seem to vary with the individual feelings of 'the judges.' In fact,
some courts refuse to state any rule and simply say that the appropriateness
of the instruction depends upon the particular facts of each case!
Various courts have taken at least five different positions: , First, the
instruction should be given in all cases where negligence is the basis of lia-
bility. Second, the instruction should be given in all cases where there is
some evidence tending to absolve the defendant from negligence. Third,
the instruction should be given whenever there is some evidence tending to
show that both the plaintiff and the defendant were exercising due care
even though, the evidence does not disclose an unknown cause or cause out-
side the control of the parties.' Fourth, the instruction should be given
only when there is evidence indicating that the accident was caused by some
unknown cause or some cause not under the control of either the plaintiff
or the defendant." Fifth, the instruction should never be given.'
OSee e.g., Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co, supra note 5 (dissenting opinion) ; Lucero v.
Torres, 67 N.M. 10, 350 P.2d 1028 (1960) ; Rodoni v. Hoskin ...... Mont ........ 355 P.2d
296 (1960).
'See Annot., 65 A.L.R. 2d 12 (1959).
9Ibid. Harper and James suggest that jury Instructions in general provide room
within which the appellate courts are relatively free to exercise their discretion In
the control of jury verdicts. 2 HARPE-R AND JAMEs, THE LAw OF ToRTs 886, 889
(1956). Much of this control seems to have been exercised in the decisions on the
unavoidable accident instruction.9Shiya v. Reviea, 122 Cal. App. 2d 155, 264 P.2d 190 (1.953) ; Tharp . Mundy, 196
F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1952).
"Hanks v. Norby, 152 Ore. 610, 54 P.2d 836 (1936).
'Hinkle v. Union Transfer Co., 229 F.2d 403, (10th Cir. 1955) ; Orange & N.W. I.
Co. v. Harris, 127 Tex. 13, 89 S.W.2d 973 (1966) ; Schevers v. American Ry. Exp. Co.,
195 Iowa 423, 192 N.W. 255 (1923). The dissent In the Instant case, by attempting
to distinguish Rodoni v Hoskins ....... Mont ........ 355 P.2d 296 (1960), implies the
exact opposite of this position; namely, that there mu8t be evidence of negligence
on the part of both the defendant and the plaintiff before the said instruction is
proper. Instant case, at 100 and 101. However, It Is difficult to see why an issue
of contributory negligence is necessary to make the instruction proper.
'
2Fogan v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 322 Mo. X03, 19 S.W.2d 707 (1929) ; Huey
v. Stephens, 275 P.2d 254 (Okla. 1954); Hayward v. Ginn, 306 P.2d 320 (Okla.
1957) ; Lawrence v. Hayes, 92 Ga. App. 778, 90 S.E. 2d 102 (1955) ; White v. Akers,
125 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939). This position may be subdivided into three
further positions; namely, where there is evidence indicating that 1) the cause was
unknown, 2) the accident was caused by an Act of God, and 3) the accident was
caused by something else outside the control of the parties
'Many cases give general disapproval to the instruction. See, e.g., Van Matre v.
Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Transp. Co., 268 Wis. 399, 67 N.W. 2d 831 (1955) ; Williams
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Once it has been determined in which situations the instruction may
properly be given, it must still be determined whether it is reversible error
to deny the instruction in those situations or to give it in others. Some
courts claim that, although to give the instruction may be proper or im-
proper in a particular situation, it is never reversible error to give or deny
it because it is simply superfluous and cannot cause prejudice on either
side. ' Other courts claim that when the instruction is proper it is essential
for a fair trial and refusal to give it would constitute a reversible error.'
Many courts also hold that it is reversible error to give the instruction when
it is improper, because it is confusing and misleading."6
T'he position of the Montana Supreme Court on the unavoidable ac-
cident instruction has not been entirely clear. In none of the five earlier
Montana cases which have directly dealt with the problem has the Montana
Supreme Court declared that the instruction was properly given, nor has
the court said that it should never be given. In three of the cases, Tanner
v. Smith,' Jewett v. Gleason,' and Stevens v. City of Buttey the court
held that the trial court had not erred in denying the instruction. There
was no evidence in these three cases of any intervening or outside cause and
the court declared that where the accident was clearly caused by the negli-
gence of someone, the instruction is improper. In the other two cases, Bogo-
vich v. Scandrett,' and Rodoni v. Hoskin,' the court held that the trial
courts had committed reversible error in giving the instruction. In all five
of these cases the court either stated or intimated that in the right fact
situation, the instruction would be proper. It was felt necessary to define
an unavoidable accident in two of the cases." In the Rodoni case, the court
makes the following statement :2
It is our opinion that an instruction as to "unavoidable accident"
could help the jury to understand the legal concepts involved in an
v. Matlin, 328 Ill. App. 645, 66 N.E.2d 719 (1946). Even where such a rule prevails,
it would of course yield to special statute. Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co. supra note 5
(dictum). For an example of a statute that makes an unavoidable accident a spe-
cial defense, see CAr. VEH. CODE § 21702. There is no such statute in Montana.
"
4Bahakel v. Great Southern Trucking Co., 249 Ala. 363, 31 So.2d 75 (1947) ; Harding
v. Hoffman, 158 Neb. 86, 62 N.W.2d M33 (1954).
'Piggott v. Newman, 334 Ill. App. 75, 78 N.E.2d 328 (1948) ; Schapiro v. Meyers,
160 Md. 208, 153 AtI. 27 (1931) ; see also Annot., 65 A.L.R. 2d 12, 137.6Supra note 9; Rodoni v. Hoskin, supra note 7; see Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 12, 131-136.
1797 Mont. 229, 33 P.2d 547 (1934).
'8104 Mont. 63, 65 P.2d 3 (1937).
10 -. -5.. .9 0. A00 10
'-117 Mont. 341, 158 P.2d 637 (1945).
...... Mont ........ 355 P.2d 296 (1960).
'In Tanner v. Smith, 97 Mont. 229, 235, 33 P.2d 547, 549 (1934) the court said In un-
avoidable accident is "a casualty which happens when all means which common
prudence suggests have been used to prevent it." In Bogovich v. 'Schandrett, 117
Mont. 341, 347, 158 P.2d 637, 639 (1945), the court said, "Unavoidable Accident has
been defined as meaning an accident which cannot be avoided by that degree of
prudence, foresight, care, and caution which the law requires of every one under
the circumstances of the particular case, which is not occasioned in any degree,
either remotely or directly, by the want of such care and skill as the law holds
every man bound to exercise, or which occurs without fault attributable to anyone."
The court declared the words "mere accident" and "pure accident" to be synony-
mous with the term "unavoidable accident"; but it distinguished an unavoidable
accident from an Act of God, which it labeled "Inevitable."
2'355 P.2d at 299.
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appropriate case and would not confuse them or hinder them in
reaching a just conclusion. .. . It might be appropriate where there
was "surprise, sudden appearance and reasonably unanticipated
presence of a pedestrian" . . . or it might be appropriate where
facts are present in the case concerning "unavoidable accident" as
this court stated in the Bogovich case, supra.
A rule indicating Under what facts the instruction would be proper,
however, cannot be found in any of the Montana cases. The evidence in
the Bogovich case clearly showed that at least one of the parties, if not both,
were negligent. In asserting that the instruction was improper, the court
appears to have rejected the first and second positions above and to have
gone at least as far down the scale as the third position, i.e., that the in-
struction should be limited to those cases where there is some evidence
tending to show that both the plaintiff and the defendant were free from
negligence. But this assumed position was rejected in the Rodoni case;
there the evidence indicated that the plaintiff was free from contributory
negligence, but the defendant's negligence was at issue. Unless the court
was holding the defendant negligent as a matter of law, it appears to adopt
the fourth position, i.e., that the Instruction should be given only when
there is some evidence indicating that the accident was caused by some un-
known cause or some cause that could not have been anticipated by either
the plaintiff or the defendant.
The instant case expressly holds that the instruction is never proper
if there is any evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant.' If
there were no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant, the de-
fendant should be entitled to a directed verdict. In effect, therefore, the
court appears to say that the instruction is always improper and will con-
stitute reversible error whenever it is given. This holding is consistent only
with the fifth position, i.e., the instruction is absolutely disapproved. The
quoted language of the Rodoni case seems to be overruled. If the court had
taken this position expressly, much confusion with regard to the unavoid-
able accident instruction in Montana could have been eliminated.
THOMAS E. TOWE
-'The court holds further that it is reversible error to give the instruction. But
neither in the instant case nor in the Rodoni case does the court discuss how the
instruction prejudices the plaintiff.
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